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Within- and Between-Culture Variation: Individual Differences and the Cultural Logics of Honor, Face, and Dignity Cultures

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The CuPS (Culture × Person × Situation) approach attempts to jointly consider culture and individual differences, without treating either as noise and without reducing one to the other. Culture is important because it helps define psychological situations and create meaningful clusters of behavior according to particular logics. Individual differences are important because individuals vary in the extent to which they endorse or reject a culture’s ideals. Further, because different cultures are organized by different logics, individual differences mean something different in each. Central to these studies is concepts of honor-related violence and individual worth as being inalienable versus socially conferred. We illustrate our argument with 2 experiments involving participants from honor, face, and dignity cultures. The studies showed that the same “type” of person who was most helpful, honest, and likely to behave with integrity in one culture was the “type” of person least likely to do so in another culture. We discuss how CuPS can provide a rudimentary but integrated approach to understanding both within- and between-culture variation.

Keywords: culture, individual differences, within-culture variation, between-culture variation, honor, face, dignity

There are two indisputable facts about human behavior: (a) There can be wide differences in behavior between people of different cultures, and (b) within any given culture, individuals can vary widely from each other. And, as has often been observed, one person’s data are another person’s noise. Thus, those who study cultural differences sometimes do not pay much attention to individual variation or treat it as error, and those who study individual differences sometimes do not pay much attention to cultural variation.

In the present article, we sketch out an approach that, in a rudimentary way, addresses both within- and between-culture variation. It considers individual differences and cultural variation jointly, without reducing one to the other. That is, it considers culture neither as “personality writ large” nor individual differences as “culture writ small.” The approach examines individual differences, showing that people vary in the extent to which they internalize or endorse a cultural ideal. And it examines cultural differences, showing how cultures help define psychological situations and create different clusters of behavior according to differing logics. In this approach, individuals are always in a cultural context, but they are not always of it.

We describe a Culture × Person × Situation approach (abbreviated as CuPS). There are no asocial people. There are no cultural situations. Thus, culture, person, and situation are all considered together. The approach blends one very useful way of thinking about personality (Mischel, Mendoza-Denton, and colleagues’ Person × Situation interactionism) with one very useful way of thinking about culture (Triandis’s notion of a cultural syndrome) to attempt to give an integrated account of within- and between-culture variation.

The first part of this introduction outlines the general rationale for a CuPS approach. As noted below, taking a CuPS approach requires understanding the particular logics of the cultures under study. Thus, in the second part of this introduction, we outline the contexts and logics of three different cultural syndromes (a culture of dignity, a culture of honor, and a culture of face). These three syndromes are contrasted with respect to the meaning and importance given to norms of exchange, reciprocity, punishment, honesty, and trustworthiness. In the third part, we apply the CuPS approach to the three particular syndromes and use them to make predictions about patterns of within- and between-group variability that we expected to see in our experiments.

Part 1: The CuPS Approach Blends Personality and Cultural Psychology

The Importance of Understanding Psychological Meanings and Cultural Logics

Mischel and colleagues’ Person × Situation approach derives from the observation that whereas a person may not show huge
consistency in behavior across situations, that person may show great consistency within a given situation across time (Mischel, 1990). Thus, across all situations, Ivan may be no more aggressive than Dmitry on average. However, Ivan may be more aggressive in response to authority or against his parents, whereas Dmitry may be more aggressive with peers or in competitive situations. Importantly, situations are not simply defined nominally (“in the park,” “at lunch”); rather, situations are defined psychologically (“in response to authority,” “when vying for status”) in terms of their psychological meanings to the actor (Mischel & Shoda, 1995; for an application to culture, see Mendoza-Denton & Mischel, 2007).

This emphasis on psychological meanings bridges the gap to culture, and more particularly, to the notion of a cultural syndrome (Triandis, 1994). A syndrome is not simply like a trait (e.g., “people in Culture X are extroverted”). A syndrome is more like a constellation of shared beliefs, values, behaviors, practices, and so on that are organized around a central theme (e.g., cultural themes of individualism and collectivism or those about face vs. honor; Triandis, 1994; see also Adams & Markus, 2004). A particular cultural logic weaves together various scripts, behaviors, practices, and cultural patterns around this central theme, giving them a meaning and a certain logical consistency and coherence for the people of a culture—even if they may not appear consistent or coherent to people outside the culture, whose worldviews may be organized around a different theme by a different cultural logic. Because the logic of one culture may contradict the logic of another culture, people standing outside a given culture often do not “get it.” They fail to understand the sense or coherence in the behavior of people in that other culture. For example, those outside an honor culture may wonder, “How come they are so polite and quick to be helpful and generous but also so ready to use violence?” or “How come he’ll be my friend forever, but he’ll kill me if I insult his mother?” Conversely, those of an honor culture may look at those of a dignity culture and ask, “How can they pride themselves on their integrity and yet be so spineless?” Or those of a face culture may look at those of a dignity culture and ask, “How can those people be so trustworthy and yet also be so selfish and self-centered?” whereas those of a dignity culture may look at those of a face culture and ask, “How can they be good for their word when they haven’t got a sturdy inner sense of self and are so dependent on getting other people to like them?” and so on.

### Individual Variability Within a Culture

Cultural syndromes are carried forward in situations, institutions, and the heads and bodies of individuals (Cohen & Leung, 2009). Yet, just as culture is not “personality writ large” (Benedict, 2006b), people are not also simply “culture writ small.” Individuals may buy into the dominant theme of their culture, or they may reject it. Those who reject it are sometimes considered “error” by those who study culture. However, we should not hastily consider such individuals “error,” because their behavior is not in fact random: Individuals are always within a cultural system. That system has defined certain clusters of behavior as going together. And even when individuals reject the dominant cultural syndrome, they create their lives guided at least in part by predefined cultural templates that have already clustered certain sets of behaviors as being similar in meaning.

Psychologists who study culture with a focus on prototypical members of that culture may end up ignoring a great deal of individual variation (for exceptions, see, e.g., Allport, 1961; Benet-Martinez & Karakitaoglu-Ayyun, 2003; Benet-Martinez, Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002; Fu et al., 2007; Oishi, 2004; Triandis, Chan, Bhawuk, & Iwao, 1995). However, those who study individual differences alone may ignore the way those differences become meaningful only within a cultural system. Because different cultural syndromes create different clusters of behavior according to their own cultural logics, an individual difference may predict one sort of behavior in Culture 1 and a very different sort of behavior (perhaps even the opposite behavior) in Culture 2. Blending personality and cultural psychology into the CuPS approach allows one to study individual variation in a cultural context—without reducing a culture to just its prototypical members and without viewing individuals as asocial, acultural beings operating outside any influence from larger systems of meaning.

### Part 2: The Cultural Logics of Dignity, Honor, and Face Systems

In the CuPS approach, taking culture into consideration means paying attention to the particular cultural logics of the cultures under study. This is in contrast to more traditional approaches that consider individual differences and culture. For example, a more traditional approach might try to (a) find a cultural difference in Behavior Y, (b) find a relevant individual-level variable X that both predicts Y and differs in its mean level across cultures, and then (c) show that the individual-level variable mediates the cross-cultural effect. Such an approach tends to do two things. First, it places culture completely within the person (rather than in person–environment interactions). Second, it implicitly relies on using one (presumably universal) cultural logic because it assumes that Variable X uniformly predicts Y within both cultures.

The CuPS approach, however, considers the possibility of multiple cultural logics, with Variable X potentially meaning very different things to people in different cultural systems. Thus, in this approach, Variable X may predict a given behavior in one culture, and it may predict the opposite type of behavior in another culture. If Variable X is an individual difference variable, then the same “type” of person may behave in opposite ways in different cultures. (And conversely, opposite “types” of people may end up behaving the same way in different cultures.)

To make predictions about how an individual difference variable X will predict a behavior Y, it is thus necessary to understand the particular logics of a cultural system—in this case, the logics of dignity, honor, and face cultures. The logics of each are self-contained, but contrasts between these systems as “ideal types” (Weber, 1997) can be quite informative and are summarized in Table 1. A thorough description is not possible here. So we instead concentrate on issues related to two problems that are common to all societies and that no society can ignore: (a) the problem of social order (How can cooperation emerge? Who or what gets to legitimately use violence and when?) and (b) the problem of valuation (What is the source of a person’s worth—is it inherent or is it given by others?; Colson, 1975; Hobbes, 1651/1982; Smith, 1759/1976). More specifically, we focus below on how different societies, in dealing with these two problems, have come up with differing ideas about morality, exchange, reciprocity, punishment,
and the inalienable versus socially conferred worth of the individual.

**Ideal Type 1: Cultures of Dignity**

The logic of dignity is familiar to most readers, because it is the logic of modern American/Western culture (see Berger, Berger, & Kellner, 1973, p. 88, who used the term in describing “modern consciousness”). Dignity is defined in theory (even if not always in practice) as “the conviction that each individual at birth possessed an intrinsic value at least theoretically equal to that of every other person” (Ayers, 1984, p. 19). Thus, the key idea is that each individual has inherent worth, and this worth does not depend on the esteem of other people. This worth is neither conferred by others nor can it be taken away by them. As such, it is inalienable.

Accordingly, dignity is relatively impervious to insults and threats from others. “Sticks and stones may break my bones, but names will never hurt me” would be a dignity motto. Ayers’s (1984, p. 20) metaphor is that “Dignity might be likened to an internal skeleton, to a hard structure at the center of the self.” The locus of dignity is thus deep inside the individual, as is the individual’s moral center. A person with a sense of dignity is a sturdy person who will behave according to his or her own internal standards, rather than being driven by impulse or the whims of the situation. The internal sturdiness and integrity keeps the individual from being corrupted by other people, and it also guarantees that a person will behave rightly, whether or not his or her good behavior will be seen by others. As a device for self-control, guilt (the pang of internal conscience) is considered more important than shame (which implies a real or imagined audience; see also Benedict, 2006a; Kashima et al., 2004; Y.-H. Kim & Cohen, 2010).

Systems of exchange in dignity cultures are most compatible with those of a market economy (Ayers, 1984). Markets and the idea of dignity both grow in the same fertile soil: an egalitarian system of autonomous individuals, guided by conscience but also backed up by an effective system of law that can enforce contracts and property rights and protect individuals from predation and violence (Henrich et al., 2006; Smith, 1759/1976). Positive reciprocity—often in the form of short-run tit-for-tat exchanges—is important in such systems, both because it is morally correct (a sign of integrity and trustworthiness) and because it is rational—being part of “self-interest, rightly understood” (Tocqueville, 1840/2010). However, reciprocity does not have the acknowledged overwhelming importance that it does in other systems, where positive reciprocity (as in gift exchange) tends to be a “total social fact” (Mauss, 2000) or where negative reciprocity (as in the willingness to punish those who have crossed you) is necessary for self-defense (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Miller, 1990, 1993).

**Ideal Type 2: Cultures of Honor**

In contrast to dignity’s emphasis on internal, inalienable worth, honor, as a claim to precedence and to virtue, has both an external and an internal quality. It is “the value of a person in his own eyes, but also in the eyes of his society. It is his estimation of his own worth, his claim to pride, but it is also the acknowledgment of that claim . . . his right to pride” (Pitt-Rivers, 1966, p. 21; see also IJzerman, van Dijk, & Gallucci, 2007; Rodriguez Mosquera, Fischer, Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2008; Uskul, Cross, Sunbay, Gercék-Swing, & Ataca, 2009). Honor must be claimed, and honor must be paid by others. A person who claims honor but is not paid honor does not in fact have honor.

Cultures of honor tend to originate in “lawless” environments, where a weak (or nonexistent) state is unable to enforce contracts, protect individuals from predation, or punish the guilty. In such environments, payback becomes an organizing theme. An honorable person is trustworthy and can be counted on to pay back his or her debts. And an honorable person demands respect, will not tolerate being cheated or affronted, and will pay back wrongs done
to him or her (Miller, 1993). What people from dignity cultures typically do not understand is that positive reciprocity and negative reciprocity go together in the logic of an honor culture. Reciprocity—the willingness to pay back the good as well as the bad—is one aspect of what unifies honor-as-virtue with honor-as-precedence (Cohen & Leung, 2010; O’Neill, 1999).

Insults take on special importance in honor cultures, because they are probes or tests of who can do what to whom. A person who establishes that he will not tolerate even small slights establishes that he cannot be pushed around on big issues either (Daly & Wilson, 1988; Ijzerman et al., 2007). In the absence of state protection, self-protection through violence or the credible threat of violence is necessary: A reputation for toughness deters competitors who would enhance their own honor or claim to precedence by taking some of yours. This logic has recreated cultures of honor in many different social environments:

Whenever the authority of law is questioned or ignored, the code of honor reemerges to allocate the right to precedence and dictate the principles of conduct: as among aristocracies and criminal underworlds, school boy and street corner societies, open frontiers and the closed communities where reigns “The Honorable Society,” as the Mafia calls itself. (Pitt-Rivers, 1968, p. 510)

Honor is unlike dignity in that honor has internal and external qualities that can be difficult to separate. Unlike inalienable dignity, honor can also be gained or it can be taken away, often through direct competition with others. And finally, honor is also dedicated to short-term “irrationality” in that it abhors cost–benefit calculations. Honor guarantees right conduct and reciprocity regardless of “rationality,” whether that means acting spitefully by risking life and limb in a fight to pay back an insult or making a grand gesture purely for the sake of principle (as in the story of Abraham Lincoln walking 6 miles to return a penny). What those outside honor cultures may not understand is that gaining a reputation for reciprocity (and a willingness to be “irrational” in the short run) may be beneficial and ultimately most rational in the long run in environments where honor establishes one as both trustworthy and not to be messed with (Nesse, 2001).

**Ideal Type 3: Cultures of Face**

Face is defined essentially by what other people see. Thus, face is like honor in that the sentiments of other people are extremely important. Like honor, face also can involve a claim to virtue or to prestige. However, the settings—and consequently, the role expectations—are quite different for cultures of honor and cultures of face. Whereas honor is contested in a competitive environment of rough equals, face exists in settled hierarchies that are essentially cooperative.

Ho (1976, p. 883; see also Heine, 2001) defined face as “the respectability and/or deference which a person can claim . . . by virtue of [his or her] relative position” in a hierarchy and the proper fulfillment of his or her role. Thus, everyone in the hierarchy can have some face, though some may have more than others due to their position. Implicitly, people have face—unless they lose it. A person can “gain” face, and one person can “give face” to another, but the major focus is primarily on not losing face (Hamamura, Meijer, Heine, Kamaya, & Hori, 2009). This is reflected in the expression “saving face,” a saying that came into English from British expatriates living in China (“Face,” 2003).

Because face exists within a stable hierarchy, it is not competitive or zero sum. In an honor culture, one person may take another’s honor and appropriate it as his or her own; however, one cannot increase one’s face by taking another’s. In a face culture, people are obliged to work together to preserve each other’s face, and because it is bad form to cause another to lose face, formalities are carefully observed, and direct conflicts are avoided (Gelfand, Lim, & Raver, 2004; Gelfand, Nishii, & Raver, 2006; Gelfand et al., 2001; Sanchez-Burks & Mor Barak, 2004). If one person openly aggrieves another, it disrupts the harmony and order of the system. And unlike in honor cultures, it is not incumbent on the victim to directly redress the grievance him- or herself. Direct retaliation by the victim is unnecessary because the group or a superior is able to punish the offender; in fact, direct retaliation would be undesirable because it would further upset the harmony of the system.

The 3 H’s of a face culture are thus hierarchy, humility, and harmony (see discussion in Y.-H. Kim & Cohen, 2010; Y.-H. Kim, Cohen, & Au, 2010). People are supposed to show appropriate deference to hierarchy. They are supposed to display humility and not overreach on status claims (lest they learn a painful and humiliating lesson about how much status others are willing to accord them). And they are to pursue, or at least not disturb, the harmony of the system.

Shame is the punishment for bad behavior in a system of face. Those who do not have enough concern for their face and the good opinion of others will behave selfishly or inappropriately. They may also be boorish and not sensitive enough to fulfill their particularistic obligations to peers, subordinates, superiors, or others to whom they owe loyalty. Someone not concerned with face will be insensitive to its loss. Such people cannot be shamed or are shameless.

**Part 3: Overview of Studies**

The sections above sketched out dignity, honor, and face as ideal types. Ideal types rarely exist in the world. Instead, many societies are an amalgam. In the current study, we included Anglo Americans from the North of the United States, Anglo Americans from the South of the United States, Latinos, and Asian Americans. All participants were Americans, and all were familiar with notions of dignity, honor, and face. We speak of our participants not as coming from different societies, but as people whose relative familiarity with motivational systems of dignity (Northerners), honor (Southerners and Latinos), and face (Asian Americans) differs (for reviews, see, e.g., Cohen, Hoshino-Browne, & Leung, 2007; Hamamura & Heine, 2008; Y.-H. Kim et al., 2010; Triandis, 1994; Vandello & Cohen, 2003). People within each subgroup may buy into the salient cultural syndrome of their subgroup, or they may reject it. Either way, they are influenced by that syndrome, because that syndrome has a cultural logic that has clustered certain behaviors as going together, and individuals pattern their lives at least in part according to these culturally predefined clusters.

In the current studies, we examine clusters of behavior pertaining to positive reciprocity (returning a favor, paying back debts), negative reciprocity (endorsing violence in response to insults,
paying back threats), and virtue (honesty, trustworthiness, and integrity), as well as the belief in the inalienable versus socially conferred valuation of the person. The sketches above suggest that, among those from honor cultures (Southerners and Latinos), notions of reciprocity (both positive and negative) and virtue are organized around the logic of honor. Aggressive behavior in one situation may go together with helping behavior in another situation, because both are clustered by the principle of reciprocity salient within the honor logic (i.e., negative reciprocity to an insult and positive reciprocity to a favor, respectively). Similarly, aggressive behavior in one situation may go together with honest behavior in another situation, because both are organized around the honor logic (Cohen & Leung, 2010).

In Experiment 1, we examine whether people from an honor culture (Southerners and Latinos) who most endorse honor-related aggression will be more likely to show positive reciprocity in repaying a favor (consistent with the honor logic). In contrast, among people from a face or dignity culture (Asian Americans and Northern Anglo Americans), aggressive behavior in one situation may go together with not helping, because such behaviors are indicators of one’s selfishness, immaturity, or egoism. Thus, we expect that those Northern Anglos and Asian Americans who most endorse aggression will also be less likely to show positive reciprocity by going out of their way to repay a favor.

In Experiment 2, we study another virtue—honesty or trustworthiness—as we examine whether participants will cheat on a “memory test” to win money. More important, though, in Experiment 2 we manipulated the salience of the honor ideal to (a) examine the causal role that honor ideals play and (b) illustrate in dynamic fashion the way that people react toward or against salient cultural ideals that have “packaged” certain behaviors as going together. Thus, for example, we examine how Latinos and Southern Anglos who reject honor-related violence behave very differently when they react to dignity as the salient ideal (and they are thus endorsers of dignity) compared with when they react against honor as the salient ideal (and they are thus rejecters of honor).

Finally, the contrast between concepts of dignity (which emphasizes the inalienable, inherent worth of the individual) and face or honor (which emphasize one’s worth in the eyes of others) leads to another set of predictions examined in the two experiments. In a motivational system of dignity, it is sturdy, steadfast internal strength that leads to correct behavior—uncorrupted by others or by concerns of expediency. In a motivational system of face or honor, seeking the good opinion of others (rather than relying solely on solipsistic self-evaluation) promotes virtue. Thus, among Northern Anglo Americans, those who hold that a person’s worth is inalienable (rather than socially conferred) should show more prosocial reciprocity and more honest and trustworthy behavior. In contrast, among Southerners, Latinos, and Asian Americans, those who hold that worth must be socially conferred might show more prosocial reciprocity, honesty, and trustworthiness.

In sum, the “behavioral signatures” (or clusters of behavior) most prevalent in the honor group should be different than those most prevalent in the dignity and face groups when it comes to understanding how positive and negative reciprocity fit together. Similarly, the behavioral signatures most prevalent in the dignity group should be different than those most prevalent in the face and honor groups when it comes to understanding how virtue is driven by concerns with inalienable versus socially conferred worth (Mendoza-Denton & Mischel, 2007). Across Experiments 1 and 2, the type of person who has integrity and pays back favors and debts in one cultural group may be very different—even opposite—in type from the person who does so in another group.1

Experiment 1: Honor-Related Violence, Dignity, and Prosocial Reciprocity: A Mini-Odyssey Through the Psychology Building

In the present experiment, we examined how positive reciprocity was related to (a) the approval of honor-related violence and (b) the belief that an individual’s worth is inalienable (part of the

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1 A brief note on theoretical and empirical methodology: In this introduction, we have sketched out dignity, honor, and face cultures as “ideal types” (Weber, 1997). There is, of course, much more to these cultures than is sketched out above. We have used the method of ideal types not to capture everything about these cultures but to capture some of the essential “family resemblance” features (Wittgenstein, 2009) that are important for the present purposes. Within an ideal type, each culture may have distinct features. Honor cultures, for example, are not homogenous. In all honor cultures, insult and affront are matters of extreme seriousness—though some may be more hair trigger, retaliating at the faintest whim of an insult, whereas others are more slow to anger, retaliating only after a clear line has been crossed (Anderson, 1994; Cohen, Vandello, Puente, & Rantilla, 1999). In honor cultures, there is competition within a status group among rough equals, who may appropriate each other’s honor—though some honor cultures may have caste-like structures separating different status groups, while in others a rough equality may pervade society. In honor cultures, self-help justice is the ruling principle; an entity whose honor is violated cannot appeal to any overarching authority to give it justice—though cultures vary in how much claims to honor are vested in, and must be defended by, collective entities (such as clans, extended families, and so on) versus individual persons. Honor cultures also vary in how paramount female chastity and fidelity are—and in who is punished for breaches of this fidelity (Vandello & Cohen, 2003, 2008), and so on.

In addition, cultures of all types have common features that derive from human sociality—people cooperate; they compete; they want to belong and be accepted by others; they have some sense of self. The differences among types of cultures should not obscure commonalities. Indeed, there are probably many universal ideals that all cultures venerate. However, (a) not all good things can be maximized at the same time; some universal ideals are opposing; and different cultural traditions represent the elevation of some ideals over others (Shweder, 2000). And (b) even when cultures agree in their rhetoric about various ideals, cultural traditions differ in how they see various ideals as realized.

Relevant to this last point is a matter of empirical methodology. The anthropologist Mary Douglas has described the phenomenon of stolen rhetoric, by which all cultures pay homage to the same values but mean vastly different things when they talk about them. As an abstract proposition, people in many cultures will endorse the idea that a person should have “honor” or “dignity,” will agree that “losing face” is bad, and may even use terms such as honor, face, and dignity interchangeably. For the present purposes then, what is needed is a measure that does not ask about these values in a highly abstract sense but one that concretizes two of the key issues we have discussed above (namely, [a] the legitimacy of using violence in response to threat or affront and [b] the sense that personal worth is internal vs. socially conferred). The measures we use are still paper-and-pencil and so have the usual problems associated with such measures (Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002; Peng, Nisbett, & Wong, 1997). However, they at least lessen the problem of stolen rhetoric by concretizing the concepts in our measurements (see also Cohen, 2007).
dignity ideal) versus socially conferred (part of the face and honor ideals). The honor violence and inalienable versus socially conferred worth measures were both collected during the experimental session. However, the measure of positive reciprocity occurred after the study had ostensibly ended, with participants trying to find and help one of the confederates who either had or had not offered them some pieces of candy earlier. The help involved finding the confederate to tell her that she had left her “lost” computer disk on a desk outside the laboratory. Tracking down this confederate in order to inform her was no easy matter, though, and participants had a number of points at which they could decide to either abandon their search or to continue on. Our dependent variable was the participant’s actual expenditure of effort to help return the disk to the confederate.

The first prediction is that among those from an honor culture (Southerners and Latinos), those who endorse retributive violence most will also show the greatest prosocial reciprocity, following the salient theme of payback in an honor culture. However, the reverse should be true among those from face and dignity cultures (Asian Americans and Northern Anglos), because endorsing violence is more of an indicator of one’s selfishness, immaturity, or egotism for them. The second prediction is that among those from a dignity culture, those who most endorse the ideal of inalienable worth should show the greatest prosocial reciprocity. However, this should not hold or might reverse among those from face and honor cultures, because a belief in inalienable worth—unaffected by the opinions of others—is not necessarily a marker for sturdiness or integrity.

Method

Participants. Participants were 119 University of Illinois students—35 Northern Anglos composed our dignity group, 34 Asian Americans composed our face group, and 20 Southern Anglos and 30 Latinos composed our honor group. Students who had lived in the South for at least 6 years were considered Southern. The percentages of females (males) in our dignity, honor, and face groups were 46% (54%), 50% (50%), and 50% (50%), respectively. In Experiments 1 and 2, data for men and women generally looked quite similar, so the analyses were collapsed across gender. Further, in both experiments, our two honor groups (Latinos and Southerners) were quite similar for the primary analyses of interest, so the analyses below combined these two groups into one honor group. For analyses in Experiments 1 and 2, all interactions involving a Latino vs. Southerner dummy variable were not significant.)

Procedure. One participant and two confederates (of the same gender as the participant) arrived at the lab and were told that this study examined people’s perception of violence in the media and how social situations might affect such perception. They first had a brief get-acquainted task and then watched several film clips and filled out a questionnaire asking what they thought of the violence in the film.

Introducing the disk and the reciprocity manipulation. Before the clips started, we introduced two experimental manipulations. One was our disk type manipulation. As one of the confederates (who we call the disk confederate) unpacked her bag to find a pen, she took out a brightly colored computer disk and “accidentally” knocked it on the floor at the participant’s feet. This act was meant to draw the participant’s attention to the disk. In the important disk condition, the disk label showed “[The confederate’s first name]—Term Paper [appropriate semester],” and when the confederate got the disk back, she said, “Oh! This is my term paper disk. I’ve finished part of it. I’m gonna work on it tonight.” In the unimportant disk condition, the label showed “[The confederate’s first name]—Softball schedule 2002—can erase,” and when she got the disk back, she said, “Oh! This is just my old softball schedule disk. Anyway, the event is already over.” The other, more important manipulation was our reciprocity manipulation. After learning that the experiment involved watching movies, either the disk confederate or the other confederate (who we call the distraction confederate) pulled out a bag of candies (mostly Hershey’s assorted candies) and offered some to her fellow participants. If the participant did not accept on the first offer, the offerer would encourage her to take some by saying “Come on, they’re really good. You can grab some and save for later if you don’t want to eat now.” If the participant still declined, the confederate asked, “Are you sure?” No further offer was made, as the gesture was meant to sound friendly and natural, rather than pushy.

In the reciprocity condition, the disk confederate offered the candies, because after the study was over, the participant would have an opportunity to help out the disk confederate. In the nonreciprocity condition, the distraction confederate offered the candies.

Getting the endorsement of honor violence and the endorsement of inalienable versus socially conferred worth measures. After a brief icebreaker task, participants watched a series of film clips in which the protagonists were afforded and responded with violence. Our measure of endorsement of honor violence was based on how justified participants thought the violence in the film clips was (see the Measures section). After each clip, the experimenter paused the video to let participants answer questions about that clip and read the background information for the next clip. When the movies were completed, participants filled out a questionnaire that included items related to the endorsement of inalienable versus socially conferred worth (see the Measures section) and some demographic items.

The false debriefing, distraction, and lost disk set-up. After the questionnaire was completed, the study was ostensibly over. Participants were given a debriefing that repeated the cover story,

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3 The only exception was one marginally significant effect, such that Latinos in the unprimed condition of Experiment 2 were less likely to cheat than Southerners were (\( t = 1.69, p = .10 \)). This effect, however, was unrelated to the key three-way interaction we tested in Experiment 2.
and when everyone walked out of the lab, the experimenter did so as well, locked the door, and left. At this point, we needed to delay the participant’s exit so that the disk confederate could “lose” the disk. So, after leaving the lab, the distraction confederate button-holed the participant, telling her about a walkathon campaign organized by a cancer research organization and asking for a pledge. As the distraction confederate occupied the participant, the disk confederate walked about 15 ft and set down her backpack on a large desk that blocked off half the hall. The disk confederate started to unload her backpack, apparently looking for something. Pulling a small piece of paper from her backpack, the disk confederate asked, “Do either of you know where Room 25 is? I’ve got to meet a study group there in 5 minutes,” thus alerting the participant to where the disk confederate was going next.

After the participant (or distraction confederate) answered that Room 25 would be in the basement, the disk confederate then packed up her backpack, “accidentally” leaving the disk out on the desk, and headed toward the basement. The distraction confederate was positioned so that the participant could not see the disk being “lost,” and she continued to talk to the participant so that the disk confederate had time to get away. After enough time had elapsed, the distraction confederate finished talking to the participant, looked at her watch, and said, “Cool! I might be able to still catch my TA during office hours.”

**Tracking down the disk confederate (or not).** As the participant and distraction confederate left, they had to walk past the large desk on which the brightly colored disk had been left. The participant could either spontaneously notice the disk, or if he or she did not, the distraction confederate would say, “Hey, isn’t that [disk confederate’s name]’s disk? She was going to Room 25 in the basement, right?” A pause was given to see if the participant would spontaneously offer to find the disk confederate; if not, the distraction confederate continued, “Well, I’d go to find her and tell her that she left her disk here, but I’ve gotta run and catch my TA before office hours are over.”

This interaction in the hallway represented the first decision point: Would the participant assume responsibility for finding and alerting the disk confederate? And if so, how eager would the participant be to do so? If the participant did not volunteer to find the disk confederate, the experiment ended, and the distraction confederate debriefed the participant. If the participant did volunteer to find the disk confederate (or take the disk to her), the experiment continued. Participants who assumed responsibility then needed to go down four floors to the basement and find Room 25—not an easy task, because Room 25 is tucked away past a set of double doors and down a ramp. Further, the signs in the psychology building range from being not helpful to being confusing and misleading, with a few signs directing participants to the wrong area of the building or even the wrong floor (see Figure 1).

If participants actually succeeded in finding Room 25, their effort helping score was 1 point. However, if participants wanted to find the disk confederate, they were not done, because a sign taped to the door of Room 25 said, “Meeting moved to Room 841 (8th floor).” At this point, participants could decide to simply abandon their search by taking the exit (located tantalizingly nearby) or instead go up the nine floors to find the disk confederate.

If participants continued the search, they could take the back staircase up nine floors and they would find Room 841 relatively quickly. If they took the main staircase or used the elevator, they would have to go to the building’s farthest point to find the room. Getting to Room 841 increased participants’ effort helping score by 1 point.

However, if participants wanted to tell the disk confederate in person that she had left her disk on the 3rd floor, they were not done yet. A sign taped to the door of Room 841 said, “Went to get TV and VCR. Will be back soon.” At this point, participants could either abandon the search or wait at Room 841. If they waited for at least 1 min, their effort helping score increased 1 more point.

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**Figure 1.** Finding Room 25 is not an easy task. Signs in the psychology building can be confusing (Panels A and B), somewhat contradictory (Panel C), or occasionally point to the wrong floor (Panel D).
and the disk confederate, who had been hiding on the 8th floor, came out to end the experiment and debrief them.

In sum, participants’ scores reflected how much effort they expended in their travels to find the confederate (0 = did not help, 1 = went to basement, 2 = went to 8th floor, 3 = waited at least 1 min on the 8th floor). A few participants did unconventional things, such as dropping the disk off in the main psychology department office or the undergraduate advising office. If they did so, they received a point for every step they completed and a half point toward the next step (though all results remained significant, regardless of how these cases were scored).

Measures

Endorsement of honor-related violence. Participants’ ratings on four film clips made up our endorsement of honor index. The film clips involved the following: (a) A male high school student is pushed and taunted by a bully, who challenges him to a fight. The student later punches the bully, knocking him to the ground. (b) A female high school student (Student A) throws another female student (Student B) against her locker and hits her while she is on the floor. The incident comes after Student B has waited at least 1 min on the 8th floor. Student A also insulted Student A’s friend and called Student A a psycho. Student A demanded an apology from Student B, who ignored the demand. (c) At a bar in the Old West, a farmhand punches a cowboy after that cowboy taunts and provokes him. And (d) a farmer explains to his wife why he must go to town and have a gunfight with someone trying to intimidate him and drive him off his land (a different character from the third clip).

For each clip, participants answered 10 questions such as “If Character A had not responded with violence, would you respect him (1 = much less, 7 = much more)?”, “How justified was Character A in using violence (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely justified)?”, “If Character A had not responded with violence, he would have (1 = been not much of a man, 7 = been acting reasonably),” “Do you think Character B (1 = did not deserve to be punched, 7 = deserved to be beaten worse than what he got),” and so on (for the 40-item index, α = .91).

Inalienable versus socially conferred worth. Participants indicated their agreement or disagreement with four 7-point Likert scale items that measured their endorsement of the idea that personal worth is inalienable versus socially conferred. The items we created were “How others treat me is irrelevant to my worth as a person,” “How much I respect myself is far, far more important than how much others respect me,” “No one (except me) can make me feel diminished,” and “No one can take a person’s self-respect away from him or her.” Higher numbers indicated greater endorsement of the ideal of worth as inalienable (an aspect of dignity), whereas lower numbers indicated greater endorsement of worth as socially conferred (an aspect of honor or face syndromes; Cronbach’s α = .70).

Results

The two key analyses involved Culture × Person × Situation interactions predicting prosocial reciprocity. The first analysis involved Honor Versus Nonhonor Group (Culture) × Individual Endorsement of Violence (Person) × Favor Versus No Favor to Repay (Situation). The second involved Dignity Group Versus Face/Honor Group (Culture) × Individual Endorsement of Inalienable Versus Socially Conferred Worth (Person) × Favor Versus No Favor to Repay (Situation). Our person-level variables were continuous, and thus we used multiple regression procedures, standardizing all main effect variables before creating interaction terms.

CuPS interaction: Honor violence and prosocial reciprocity in honor and nonhonor groups. Figure 2 displays the significant three-way Honor Versus Nonhonor Group × Endorsement of Violence × Favor Versus No Favor to Repay interaction ($b = -.24, \beta = -.25, t = -2.54, p = .01; \text{see Table 2})$. Thus, among participants from an honor culture (Southerners and

![Figure 2](image-url)
Latinos), those who most endorsed payback in the form of honor-related violence also went the furthest to repay the confederate who had given them a gift of candy, compared with those who rejected honor-related violence. (Centering the culture variable at the honor group and the situation variable at the favor to repay values, the simple slope of violence endorsement was \(b = 0.44\), \(\beta = 0.45\), \(t = 2.13\), \(p = .04\); Aiken & West, 1991.) Conversely, among the nonhonor groups (Northern Anglos and Asian Americans), those who rejected violence expended the most effort to repay, compared with those who endorsed violence. (Centering culture at the nonhonor group and situation at the favor to repay values, the simple slope of violence endorsement was \(b = -0.48\), \(\beta = -0.49\), \(t = -2.02\), \(p = .05\).) Thus, for the condition where the disk confederate had given the participant the candy gift, the simple interaction between Honor Versus Nonhonor Group \(\times\) Endorsement of Violence was significant in predicting effort to repay (\(b = 0.45\), \(\beta = 0.47\), \(t = 2.93\), \(p = .004\)).

In the condition where the disk confederate had not offered any candy and thus there was no gift to repay, there was no significant relation between endorsement of honor violence and effort expended to return the disk for either group (simple interaction of Honor vs. Nonhonor Group \(\times\) Endorsement of Violence was \(b = -0.03\), \(t = -0.28\), \(p = .78\)).

**CuPS interaction: Endorsement of inalienable versus socially conferred worth and prosocial reciprocity in dignity versus face/honor groups.** The expected three-way CuPS interaction between Dignity Versus Nondignity Group \(\times\) Inalienable Versus Socially Conferred Worth \(\times\) Favor Versus No Favor to Repay was also significant in predicting the participant’s effort expended to help the confederate, as seen in Figure 3 (\(b = 0.25\), \(\beta = 0.25\), \(t = 2.69\), \(p = .01\); see Table 3). Thus, among participants from a dignity culture (Northern Anglos), there was an interaction: More endorsement of the ideal of inalienable worth predicted more effort to help when there was a favor to repay, compared with when there was no favor to repay.

### Table 2

*Regression Analyses Predicting Participants’ Effort Expended to Help the Disk Confederate for CuPS Interaction Involving Endorsement of Honor-Related Violence (Experiment 1)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>(b)</th>
<th>(SE) of (b)</th>
<th>(\beta)</th>
<th>(t)</th>
<th>(p)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Honor group vs. nonhonor group (C)</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual endorsement of honor violence (P)</td>
<td>-1.15</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-1.15</td>
<td>-1.53</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor to repay or not (S)</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C \times S)</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(P \times S)</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C \times P)</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C \times P \times S)</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-2.54</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* \(N = 119\). Change in \(R^2\) after adding the Culture \(\times\) Person \(\times\) Situation (CuPS) interaction to the model = .05. All variables standardized before creating interaction terms and entering in the model. Higher numbers for the variables indicate that the participant was from an honor group (vs. nonhonor group), approved more of honor-related violence, and did not have a favor to repay.

\(p < .05\).

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**Figure 3.** Effort expended to return the "lost" disk by participants from the dignity and face/honor groups, as a function of the individual’s belief in inalienable versus socially conferred worth (1 SD below and above the mean) and whether there was a favor to repay. Higher numbers indicate greater effort to return the lost disk. The Culture \(\times\) Person \(\times\) Situation (Dignity vs. Face/Honor Groups \(\times\) Endorsement of Inalienable vs. Socially Conferred Worth \(\times\) Favor vs. No Favor to Repay) three-way interaction was significant at \(p = .01\).
repay. (Centering culture at the Northern Anglo group, the simple interaction of Inalienable vs. Socially Conferred Worth, and did not have a favor to repay.

Table 3
Regression Analyses Predicting Participants’ Effort Expended to Help the Disk Confederate for CuPS Interaction Involving Endorsement of Inalienable Versus Socially Conferred Worth (Experiment 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>SE of b</th>
<th>( \beta )</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual endorsement of inalienable vs. socially conferred worth (P)</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor to repay or not (S)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C × S</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P × S</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.67</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C × P</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C × P × S*</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. \( N = 119 \). Change in \( R^2 \) after adding the Culture × Person × Situation (CuPS) interaction to the model = .06. All variables standardized before creating interaction terms and entered in the model. Higher numbers for the variables indicate that the participant was from a face/honor group (vs. dignity group), endorsed inalienable (vs. socially conferred) worth, and did not have a favor to repay.

* \( p < .05 \).

Further Analyses

Eagerness to help. During the crucial interaction in the hallway, we also obtained an attitude measure by having the distraction confederate rate how eager the participant was to assume responsibility for helping the disk confederate (1 = not at all eager to 7 = very eager). Both confederates were blind to hypotheses and to the participant’s scores on the relevant individual difference variables. This attitude variable was correlated at .62 with the behavioral measure of actual effort expended to help, and analyses using this attitude dependent variable looked similar to analyses using effort expended as a dependent variable. If one uses multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) to examine attitude toward helping and actual effort expended, the multivariate tests for both CuPS interactions above were significant at \( p = .02 \), with the univariate tests for all attitude and actual effort dependent variables being significant at \( p = .01 \).

Doing good versus getting credit for doing good. The final act of helping—waiting around on the 8th floor—may be less an indicator of helping and more an indicator of wanting to “get credit” for helping. Once at Room 841, participants might have just as easily written the confederate a note. Truncating the dependent variable so far favor to repay was \( b = -.43, \beta = -.43, t = -2.56, p = .01 \). On the other hand, for the face and honor groups (Latinos, Southerners, and Asian Americans), there was no such interaction effect (simple interaction: \( b = .11, t = .99, p = .33 \)).

Discussion

Experiment 1 illustrates the usefulness of the CuPS approach for understanding behaviors related to prosocial reciprocity, violence, and inalienable versus socially conferred worth. Dignity, face, and honor cultures have very different cultural logics. The ideal of honor connects paying back favors and paying back insults through the salient cultural theme of reciprocity. The ideals of face and dignity connect paying back favors and not paying back insults through salient cultural themes about either preserving group harmony (for the face culture) or being sturdy in one’s integrity (for the dignity culture; Cohen, 2010; IJzerman & Cohen, 2010).

It is not the case that everyone within a culture follows the ideals of his or her culture. Rather, there are individual differences, and the ideals of honor, dignity, and face are what individuals react toward or against in their respective cultures. The Culture × Person × Situation interactions in this study illustrate the importance of considering both cultural logics and individual differences, because the culture variable effectively flips the individual difference variable on its head in this experiment. Southerners and Latinos who were most endorsing of honor-related violence were also the ones who went the furthest to repay a favor, whereas Asian Americans and Northern Anglos who most endorsed honor-related violence were the ones who were least likely to return a favor. Thus, the type of person most likely to return a favor in one culture was also the type of person least likely to do so in the other culture.

Similarly, when it came to ideas about inalienable versus socially conferred worth, among the dignity group (Northern Anglos), those most endorsing of inalienable worth were the most likely to return a favor. In contrast, among the face and honor groups, rejecting inalienable worth was no marker of a lack of

Footnote 4: We thank Daphna Oyserman for this observation.
sturdiness or a tendency toward expediency. Among those from face or honor cultures, participants endorsing the idea of socially conferred worth were at least as likely to pay back a favor as those endorsing inalienable worth.

Experiment 2: Being Honest and Trustworthy in Honor, Face, and Dignity Cultures

Experiment 2 extended the results of Experiment 1 in a few ways: First, we examined how dignity, honor, and face relate to another indicator of integrity, namely, willingness to cheat on a memory test for money. Second, we examined a completely anonymous and unmonitored situation. In Experiment 1, a diligent participant might receive the confederate’s gratitude for returning the disk. In Experiment 2, the anonymity of the situation means there is no extrinsic reward or recognition for not cheating (see also the Further Analyses section in Experiment 1). Third, we included an exploratory measure specifically designed to measure face, adapting Zane and Yeh’s (2002) Loss of Face Scale to stress what was distinctive about face cultures, such as the emphasis on humility and the mostly downward focus on trying not to lose face. (As noted earlier, honor can be gained or lost; in any given interaction, concern with face tends to be more focused on preventing loss.)

Experimentally Manipulating the Salience of a Cultural Ideal

Most important, we examined the effect of priming honor in Experiment 2. Half of the participants saw the honor-violence film clips before taking the memory test, and half saw the clips afterward. Priming honor in the present experiment allows us to do two things. First, it strengthens the causal claim that honor is the ideal that Southerners and Latinos are reacting toward or against; second, it allows us to show that this reacting toward or against salient ideals is a dynamic process (Benet-Martinez et al., 2002; Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000; Oyserman & Lee, 2008a; Suh, Diener, & Updegraff, 2008). Dignity is the dominant discourse in mainstream American culture; in the context of this study (a scientific experiment in the psychology building on a Northern, predominately White campus), it may be that dignity is the reigning ideal that our participants react toward or against. Showing the film clips, however, should make the honor schema salient for Southerners and Latinos, and once salient, honor (not dignity) should become the cultural ideal that Southerners and Latinos react toward or against. Consequently, making the honor syndrome salient is expected to decrease cheating among the Southern and Latino participants who buy into the honor ideal. (Honor goes with paying back insults and being good for your word as an honest and trustworthy person.) Conversely, the film clips should increase cheating among the Southern and Latino participants who reject the honor syndrome, because the clips make salient an honor ideal that they react against—and again, this honor ideal packages together both the integrity to stand up for oneself against insult and the integrity to do what is right (in this case, resist cheating).

To restate a central argument of this article in more general form: Different cultures are organized by different cultural logics. These logics define certain behaviors as going together. And as individuals react toward or against the salient ideals of their culture, different characteristic patterns of behavior emerge. The priming manipulation in Experiment 2 lets us look at this process in vivo as our bicultural Latinos and Southerners react toward or against either a dignity ideal or an honor ideal—with consequences for increases and decreases in cheating behavior. Experiment 1 (in which everyone saw the film clips first) could demonstrate people reacting toward or against salient ideals in a static fashion, but the current study lets us look at this as a dynamic process with low- (or high-) violence endorsing Southerners and Latinos reacting very differently when honor (as opposed to dignity) is the salient ideal.

For Northern Anglos and Asian Americans, dignity and face (not honor) are the cultural syndromes that one reacts toward or against. For Northerners and Asian Americans, the violent protagonist in the film clips does not represent a person protecting his honor; rather, the violent protagonist represents a person who has lost his self-control and is behaving in an immature, inappropriate, or aggressive way. Thus, for the Northern and Asian American groups, showing them the violent film clips should have no salutary effect on their behavior—except to the extent that it reminds low-violence Northern Anglos and Asian Americans of what they must not do.

CuPS Interaction Involving Dignity Versus Nondignity Cultures

In addition to priming the honor ideal (or not), the second between-subjects manipulation in this study involved the experimenter casually offering half the participants a piece of gum before the study began. A person has an obligation not to cheat others—especially those others who have been nice to him or her. We expected that those Northern Anglos who endorsed dignity’s ideal of inalienable worth would be most likely to meet this obligation, compared with those Northern Anglos who rejected this ideal. Among the face and honor groups, we did not expect such an effect because a rejection of inalienable worth does not indicate a lack of sturdiness or integrity.

CuPS Interaction Involving Face Versus Nonface Cultures

Our expectation for the exploratory face measure followed a similar reasoning. If face is the dominant ideal that Asian Americans react toward or against, then offering Asian American participants a stick of gum should make those who buy into the ideal of face relatively less likely to cheat and make those who reject the ideal of face relatively more likely to cheat. Because our other groups do not hold face as a dominant ideal to react toward or against, this interaction effect involving the face variable should not occur for them.

Method

Participants. Participants were 119 University of Illinois students (37 Northern Anglos, 27 Southern Anglos, 23 Latinos, and 32 Asian Americans). Our dignity, honor, and face groups were 49% (51%), 64% (36%), and 41% (59%) female (male), respectively. Our honor group thus had a marginally greater proportion of women ($p = .10$). However, in our results, there was no main effect of gender ($p = .76$), gender did not interact with our predicted three-way interaction involving honor ($p = .96$), and gender did not interact with any other variable in the model (all $p$s
nonsignificant). Thus, for this experiment as in Experiment 1, we collapsed across gender in our analyses.

Procedure. Participants were run individually and told that the experiment was to examine people’s attitudes toward violence (i.e., the movie viewing task) and how arousal caused by watching violence can affect people’s retention and retrieval of information (i.e., the recall task). As noted above, two-between-subjects variables were introduced. First, as a reciprocity manipulation, the experimenter casually offered half the participants a piece of gum before the study had “officially” started. Second, the order of the tasks was manipulated, such that half the participants watched the honor-violence film clips first (i.e., honor was primed) and half did the memory test first (i.e., honor was not primed).

Movie task: Getting the endorsement of honor violence, the endorsement of inalienable versus socially conferred worth, and the exploratory measure of face. Participants watched and rated the four film clips and then completed a questionnaire that included the inalienable versus socially conferred worth questions (see the Measures section in Experiment 1) as well as an exploratory measure of face. For the latter, we used the Loss of Face Scale (e.g., “I maintain a low profile because I do not want to make mistakes in front of other people”; Zane & Yeh, 2002), but to emphasize the distinct features of face (vs. honor and dignity), we dropped the four questions that were conceivably related to insult and affront (someone criticizes, embarrasses, or treats me unfairly). We also dropped two questions that were neutral with respect to loss or gain of status and substituted two questions we created ourselves. Of these two new questions, one item had to do with humility (“If you won an award, you would tell your friends [reverse scored], and the other item was particularly relevant to student situations (“You do not want to ask questions in class because other students may think about how stupid you are to ask such questions.”)). Participants indicated their degree of agreement with the statements on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). The 17-item adapted scale had an alpha of .82.

An overview of the recall task: Getting the measure of cheating. For our recall task, we modified procedures used in Houston (1978) and Houston and Ziff (1976). The task involved two trials in which participants studied word lists and then tried to recall as many words as possible. During the second recall trial, one page of the word lists was “accidentally” left exposed, allowing participants to copy words from this portion of the list. From participants’ answer sheets we could not get a perfect measure of cheating by an individual, but we could infer the probability that the person cheated. For those who did not cheat, one would expect about half the words to come from the exposed list, but as the percentage of words from the exposed list increases, so does the likelihood that the person cheated.

Detailed procedure of the recall task. In the recall task, the participant was to study a two-page word list (48 words on each page) for 2 min and then recall as many words as possible for 3 min. We used an overhead projector to show the word list (printed on two transparencies laid side-by-side) during the 2-min study phase. The experimenter covered the transparencies so that only four words at a time were shown (two from page 1 and two from page 2). After approximately 5 s, she moved on to the next row of four words until all 24 lines of words were shown.

When the study phase was over, the participant wrote down as many words as he or she could remember in 3 min (there was a timer on his or her desk). After the first trial (a practice trial), the experimenter explained that in the next trial, the participant could win money based on his or her performance. More specifically, he or she would win $1 for every remembered word over 20 (up to $15). Thus, a participant who recalled 30 words would win $10. The experimenter then roughly checked the participant’s answers in the practice trial against an alphabetical word list, commenting that the participant had done a pretty good job and had a fair chance of winning some money (see Houston, 1978).

In the second trial, the study phase was repeated with the same word list. However, before the memory test phase began, the experimenter caught sight of a checklist that reminded her, among other things, that she had forgotten to check for money in the cash box. After finding no money there, the experimenter excused herself to look for money in another room. The experimenter returned a bit flustered and apologetic, explaining that she would have to run to the finance office on the 8th floor to get some money. This would take about 10 min. However, for the experiment to end on time, the participant would have to start the recall task right away and just stop when the timer indicated the trial should end. Hurriedly, the experimenter scribbled down an account number on a piece of paper, pulled the paper off her clipboard, mindlessly set the clipboard down on a table near the participant, and left the room. Removing the paper from the clipboard left one of the lists exposed. (The other list had been surreptitiously hidden when the experimenter looked for money in the other room.) The exposed list used 16-point font and was positioned so that the participant could read it discreetly without moving. When the oblivious experimenter returned with the cash, she simply checked the participant’s answers against an alphabetical list. And, if the memory test was the last task, the experimenter paid the participant any money he or she had won and ended the study with a thorough debriefing.

Results

We first used the number of words a participant recalled from the exposed list and the total number of words recalled to compute rho (ρ)—the probability that the participant would have recalled at least that many words from the exposed list by chance alone. Lower values of rho thus indicate a greater likelihood that the participant cheated. (Rho was calculated using the binomial cumulative distribution function; it can be analogized to a statistical significance level in that it is the probability of observing a result at least as extreme as the one obtained if the null hypothesis that the participant recalled words from the exposed list at chance levels [50%] were true.) A square-root transformation was then applied to rho to pull in cases where rho was exceptionally high (i.e., cases where the percentage of words from the exposed list was exceptionally below 50%). Intuitively, the difference between someone who recalled 70% of their answers from the exposed list

5 Debriefings also allowed us to probe for suspicion. Across Experiments 1 and 2, 12% of participants expressed at least some suspicion. When these participants were removed from the analyses, the conclusions of the two experiments remained unchanged.
and someone who recalled 60% of their answers from the exposed list should be bigger than the difference between someone who recalled 30% from the exposed list and someone who recalled 40% from the exposed list. In the 30% versus 40% case, both persons recalled words from the exposed list at below chance levels.\(^6\)

**Analytic strategy.** We used the same analytic strategy as in Experiment 1. There were two key Culture × Person × Situation interactions. The first was an Honor Versus Nonhonor Group (Culture) × Individual Endorsement of Violence (Person) × Violent Film Clip Prime Versus No Prime (Situation) interaction. The second was a Dignity Group Versus Face/Honor Group (Culture) × Individual Endorsement of Inalienable Versus Socially Conferred Worth (Person) × Offered Gum Versus Not Offered Gum (Situation) interaction. Our person-level variables were continuous, and thus we used multiple regression, as in Experiment 1. Data in the figures are expressed in terms of rho, the probability of continuous, and thus we used multiple regression, as in Experiment 1.

The expected three-way interaction between Honor Versus Nonhonor Group × Endorsement of Violence × Prime Versus No Prime was significant (\(b = -.06, \beta = -.19, t = -2.08, p = .04\); see Figure 4 and Table 4). In decomposing the three-way interaction, we begin with the honor group (Southerners and Latinos). For them, the prime of the film clips was supposed to make salient the ideals of the honor syndrome; primed with honor ideals, individuals who endorsed this system (as indicated by their endorsement of honor-related violence) would then cheat less, whereas individuals who rejected this system (as indicated by their disapproval of honor-related violence) would then cheat more (Endorsement of Violence × Prime for the Honor Group: \(b = -.09, \beta = -.27, t = 1.94, p = .05\)). This effect of the prime manipulation helps illustrate the causal role of honor as a salient ideal that individuals from honor cultures react toward or against—with consequences for a constellation of disparate but honor-related behaviors (in this case, being honest). As the prime highlighted honor ideals, high honor-violence and low honor-violence people from this group were not just endorsing or rejecting honor-related violence; they were endorsing or rejecting the honor syndrome and all that it entailed (including honesty).

For our nonhonor groups (Asian Americans and Northern Anglos), on the other hand, face and dignity (not honor) are the cultural syndromes that they react toward or against. Thus, for individuals from this group, the more they endorsed violence, the more they cheated (simple effect of violence for nonhonor group: \(b = -.09, \beta = -.29, t = -2.49, p = .01\)). This connection between more violence and more cheating was not qualified by any interaction with priming condition; thus, watching the film clips had no salutary effect on Asian Americans and Northern Anglos who endorsed violence (Endorsement of Violence × Prime interaction: \(b = .04, t = 0.94, p = .35\)).

Further analyses among honor culture participants: Susceptibility to having the prime shift the salient cultural ideal. As noted above, there was a Violence Endorsement × Prime interaction among the honor group, such that the prime shifting the cultural ideal made those more endorsing of violence become relatively more honest and those less endorsing of violence become relatively less honest. The prime was particularly effective among honor group members most steeped in the culture-of-honor ethos. Further analyses of Southerners in the prime condition showed that among those who had spent at least 18 years of their life in the South, there was a very strong positive relationship between endorsement of violence and honest behavior (\(r = .87, p = .01, n = 8\)). The prime was not so effective in shifting the cultural ideal for those participants who were classified as Southern but had not grown up entirely in the South (\(r = -.97, n = 5\)). (In a regression treating percentage of life in the South as a continuous variable, the Percentage of Life in the South × Violence Endorsement interaction indeed predicted honest behavior among primed Southerners; \(b = .37, \beta = .68, t = 2.54, p = .03, n = 13\).) Caution in interpreting these results is needed because of the small sample size. However, the result seems in accord with the more general point that the effectiveness of a cultural prime depends on (a) the strength of the prime (e.g., watching a few film clips vs. watching 5 hr of John Wayne films) and (b) a given participant’s susceptibility to being primed by a certain stimulus (Cheng, Lee, & Benet-Martínez, 2006; Cohen, 2007; Norenzayan & Heine, 2005).

**CuPS interaction involving the effect of the gum manipulation: Endorsement of inalienable versus socially conferred worth and cheating in dignity versus face/honor groups.** We also examined our other individual difference variable (inalienable vs. social worth) in terms of how it interacted with whether the participant was from a dignity versus a face/honor culture and whether the participant had been offered gum by the experimenter.

For our nonhonor groups (Asian Americans and Northern Anglos), the second was a Dignity Group Versus Face/Honor Group (Culture) × Individual Endorsement of Inalienable Versus Socially Conferred Worth (Person) × Offered Gum Versus Not Offered Gum (Situation) interaction. Our person-level variables were continuous, and thus we used multiple regression, as in Experiment 1.

The predicted three-way interaction of Dignity Versus Face/ Honor Culture × Inalienable Versus Socially Conferred Worth × Gum Offer was significant (\(b = .06, \beta = .19, t = 2.08, p = .04\); see Figure 5 and Table 5). As expected, among Northern Anglos, those who endorsed the dignity ideal of inalienable worth were most likely to fulfill this duty, whereas those who rejected this ideal would also be most likely to reject this duty. Among face/honor groups, we would not expect this pattern, because rejection of the ideal of inalienable worth does not indicate a lack of personal integrity.

The predicted three-way interaction of Dignity Versus Face/ Honor Culture × Inalienable Versus Socially Conferred Worth × Gum Offer interaction among Northern Anglos: \(b = -.11, \beta = -.36, t = -2.24, p = .03\). Among face/honor groups, this interaction effect did not hold.

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\(^6\) One can also use the percentage of words from the exposed list as the dependent variable, but this variable has outliers. With this dependent variable, the \(p\) levels for the two key three-way interactions (one involving violence endorsement and the other involving inalienable vs. socially conferred worth) were both significant, and this was true regardless of whether one included or excluded the outliers (all \(p s < .05\)). In the case of the simple two-way interactions, the \(p\) levels were .06 for the Endorsement of Violence × Prime interaction for the honor group and .02 for the Inalienable Versus Social Worth × Gum Offer interaction among Northern Anglos, when outliers were excluded. The \(p\) levels for the two-way interactions were .13 and .01 if outliers were included, respectively.
(Inalienable vs. Socially Conferred Worth × Gum Offer interaction among face/honor groups: b = .02, t = 0.45, p = .66). For the face/honor groups, a rejection of the idea of inalienable worth was not a marker for lack of integrity.

**CuPS interaction involving the effect of the gum manipulation:** Loss of Face Scale and cheating in face versus dignity/honor culture. The predicted three-way interaction of Face Versus Dignity/Honor Culture × Endorsement on Loss of Face Scale × Gum Offer was marginally significant (b = .06, β = .19, t = 1.79, p = .08; see Figure 6 and Table 6). As expected, among Asian Americans, those most concerned with face seemed to reject the duty brought upon them by the gift of the gum, and they became more likely to cheat (Loss of Face Scale Endorsement × Gum Offer interaction among Asian Americans: b = −1.4, β = −.46, t = −2.08, p = .04). Among the nonface groups, this interaction did not hold (two-way interaction: t = −0.20, p = .84). For them, a lack of concern with face did not predict honesty or dishonesty.

**Discussion**

In sum, Experiment 2 showed the usefulness of a CuPS approach with a very different sort of behavior than that in Experiment 1. Further, through the use of a priming manipulation, Experiment 2 strengthened the causal claim that behavioral differences among Southerners and Latinos are driven by an individual’s response toward or against honor norms. For Southern and Latino participants, the film clips made honor ideals salient and decreased cheating among those endorsing honor-related violence, whereas they increased cheating among those rejecting such violence. The present experiment demonstrated in dynamic form what Experiment 1 had demonstrated in static form—that people react toward or against salient cultural ideals, that one’s stance on

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Table 4

**Regression Analyses Predicting the Probability That Participants’ Recall of Exposed Words Was Due to Chance Alone for CuPS Interaction Involving Endorsement of Honor-Related Violence (Experiment 2)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>SE of b</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Honor group vs. nonhonor group (C)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual endorsement of honor violence (P)*</td>
<td>−0.07</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>−0.21</td>
<td>−2.31</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primed with film clips vs. not primed (S)</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>−0.04</td>
<td>−0.38</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C × S</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P × S</td>
<td>−0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>−0.05</td>
<td>−0.51</td>
<td>.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C × P</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C × P × S*</td>
<td>−0.06</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>−0.19</td>
<td>−2.08</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. N = 119. Change in R² after the Culture × Person × Situation (CuPS) interaction was added to the model = .03. All variables standardized before creating interaction terms and entered in the model. Higher numbers for the variables indicate that the participant was from an honor group (vs. nonhonor group), approved more of honor-related violence, and was not primed with the film clips. The dependent variable was square-root transformed.

*p < .05.
retributive violence positions oneself as either an endorser or rejecter of those ideals, and that this endorsing or rejecting has implications for a range of behaviors that are organized in different ways by different cultures according to their own particular cultural logic. As expected, the prime had little effect on those from dignity and face cultures. For these nonhonor groups, more endorsement of violence simply correlated with more cheating.

Experiment 2 also replicated and extended the findings of Experiment 1 with respect to a dignity culture’s ideals of inalienable worth. Among Northern Anglos given gum, those endorsing inalienable worth were the least likely to cheat. Among the face/honor groups, rejection of inalienable worth does not indicate a lack of sturdiness, and no such effect occurred for them.

Finally, we look at the CuPS interaction involving the modified Loss of Face Scale. Among our Asian Americans, those who scored high on the face measure were less likely to cheat after being given gum, whereas those unconcerned with face became relatively more likely to cheat. Among the dignity and honor groups, face is not the dominant syndrome that they react toward or against, so concern with face predicted little, and the effect did not occur for them.

**General Discussion**

It is important to understand individual variation in a cultural context. Culture is important because it helps define psychological situations and create meaningful clusters of behavior according to a particular cultural logic. Individual differences are important because individuals vary in the extent to which they internalize or endorse (or reject) a cultural syndrome. Individuals are always in a cultural context, though they are not always of it.

The CuPS perspective helps explain how the type of person in one culture who is most likely to positively reciprocate, be honest, and

**Table 5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>SE of b</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dignity group vs. face/honor group (C)⁺</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual endorsement of inalienable vs. socially conferred worth (P)</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offered gum or not (S)</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C × S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P × S</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.84</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C × P</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-1.14</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C × P × S⁺</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. N = 119. Change in R² after the Culture × Person × Situation (CuPS) interaction was added to the model = .03. All variables standardized before creating interaction terms and entered in the model. Higher numbers for the variables indicate that the participant was from a face/honor group (vs. dignity group), endorsed inalienable (vs. socially conferred) worth, and was not offered gum. The dependent variable was square-root transformed.⁺ p < .05.*
show integrity is also the type of person in another culture who is least likely to do so. Thus, among those from nonhonor cultures (Northerners and Asian Americans), the people who endorsed violence in response to threat or affront were also the people who were least likely to reciprocate a favor and most likely to cheat. However, among those from honor cultures (Southerners and Latinos), the people who endorsed violence in response to threat or affront were the people who were most likely to reciprocate a favor and most likely to show increased honesty once honor had been primed.

The same sort of pattern held for endorsing the ideal of inalienable versus socially conferred worth. Among those from a culture of dignity (Northerners), greater endorsement of inalienable worth meant greater likelihood of reciprocating a favor and greater honesty. Among nondignity groups, a belief in inalienable worth does not indicate sturdiness, and a belief in socially conferred worth does not indicate weakness of character, and so no such inalienable versus socially worth effect occurred for them.

Our exploratory face measure in Experiment 2 yielded similar results, showing how face is the dominant ideal that Asian Americans react toward or against. Asian Americans with a greater concern for face were relatively less likely to cheat the experimenter who had been nice to them, and those with little concern for face were relatively more likely to cheat her. Among the nonface groups, concern with face did not predict their honesty.

Reacting Toward or Against: A Dynamic Process

Experiment 2 also illustrated the general argument of this article in dynamic form, recapitulating in microcosm our argument that individuals are always in a cultural context, though they are not always of it (Benet-Martínez et al., 2002; Hong et al., 2000; Oishi, 2004; Zou, Morris, & Benet-Martínez, 2008). To illustrate concretely the process highlighted by Experiment 2, take two Southern or Latino individuals—Person A who endorses the notion that one

![Figure 6](image.png)

*Figure 6.* Probability that a participant’s recall of words from the exposed list was due to chance alone. Higher numbers thus imply greater honesty. Probabilities are displayed as a function of whether the participant is from a face or an honor/dignity group, the individual’s endowment on the modified Loss of Face Scale (1 SD below and above the mean), and whether he or she was offered gum. The Culture x Person x Situation (Face vs. Honor/Dignity Groups x Endorsement on the Modified Loss of Face Scale x Gum vs. No Gum) three-way interaction was marginally significant at $p = .08$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$b$</th>
<th>$SE$ of $b$</th>
<th>$\beta$</th>
<th>$t$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Face group vs. honor/dignity group (C)</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual endorsement of face (P)</td>
<td>−.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>−.02</td>
<td>−.20</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offered gum or not (S)</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C \times S$</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P \times S$</td>
<td>−.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>−.14</td>
<td>−1.41</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C \times P$</td>
<td>−.05</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>−.16</td>
<td>−1.56</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C \times P \times S$</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* $N = 119$. Change in $R^2$ after the Culture x Person x Situation (CuPS) interaction was added to the model = .03. All variables standardized before creating interaction terms and entered in the model. Higher numbers for the variables indicate that the participant was from an honor/dignity group (vs. face group), endorsed face (vs. not), and was not offered gum. The dependent variable was square-root transformed.

Table 6: Regression Analyses Predicting the Probability That Participants' Recall of Exposed Words Was Due to Chance Alone for CuPS Interaction Involving Endorsement on the Modified Loss of Face Scale (Experiment 2)
must avenge insults and Person B who adheres to the “sticks and stones . . .” motto and shrugs off insults. Put them in a situation where dignity is presumed to be the salient cultural ideal that one reacts toward or against (e.g., a situation such as a scientific lab experiment on the Illinois campus). In this context, Person A is a rejecter of the dignity ideal and thus a rejecter of dignity’s imperative toward honesty. Person B is an endorser of dignity’s ideal and thus a follower of dignity’s imperative toward honesty. Change the cultural schema to which they are reacting, however, and Person A changes from being a rejecter of dignity to an endorser of honor and honor’s imperative toward honesty. Conversely, Person B changes from being an endorser of dignity to a rejecter of honor and honor’s honesty imperative. Defining oneself as a rejecter of dignity means one is more likely to cheat; defining oneself as an endorser of honor does not. More generally, being a rejecter of Syndrome 1 is not the same as being an endorser of Syndrome 2, and so we must understand the particular cultural syndrome a person is reacting toward or against to predict behavior.

Individuals are always in a cultural context; however, especially for bicultural individuals, the cultural context they are in and reacting toward or against may change according to the situation. And this is presumably true whether situation is defined in terms of the short-term immediate surroundings or in terms of the long-term contexts of the neighborhoods, families, and social networks we find ourselves in (Oyserman, Kemmelmeier, & Coon, 2002; Oyserman & Lee, 2008a, 2008b; Oyserman & Sorensen, 2009; Steele, 1999).

Cultural Rejectionism

The interactive framework of CuPS helps one understand behavior that might seem anomalous or even bizarre from other perspectives. In the CuPS framework, people are active agents within a cultural system, reacting toward or against the dominant organizing syndrome of their culture. Recall that in Experiment 1, people from an honor culture who reject violence actually showed less effort to help our confederate when they owed her a favor (simple slope of favor to repay among honor group participants, centered at 1 SD below the violence mean: $b = .36, \beta = .36, t = 1.92, p = .06$). Recall also that in Experiment 2, people from a dignity culture who reject dignity ideals actually seemed more likely to cheat after they were offered gum (simple slope of gum offer among dignity group participants, centered at 1 SD below the inalienable worth mean: $b = .11, \beta = .37, t = 1.69, p = .09$). Why would people be less helpful and more dishonest when conditions place upon them greater obligations to behave appropriately? The answer is that people are reacting against the dominant ideals of their culture. People from an honor culture who actively reject the concept of honor are also actively rejecting the ideals of reciprocity and a package of honor-related beliefs and behaviors, and thus they are less likely to help when it is most incumbent upon them to do so. Similarly, those from a dignity culture who reject the ideals of dignity are also actively rejecting a whole set of beliefs, norms, and ideals that would place upon them greater obligations to not cheat. From a CuPS perspective, these data are not bizarre, because they show how rejectionist behavior is culturally situated and packaged (as opposed to simply “acultural”).

Of course, one hesitates to put too much faith in these two marginally significant results. However, both the above effects become significant at $p \leq .05$ when centered at 1.5 SDs (instead of 1 SD) above or below the mean (Aiken & West, 1991). More important, the general pattern of the data is relatively consistent: Cultural rejecters—that is, those who reject the dominant ideals of their respective cultures—cheat more and help less when the weight of social obligation presses heaviest upon them. For additional support, see also Figure 3 where (a) Northern Anglos who reject inalienable worth and (b) those from face/honor groups who reject socially conferred worth become less helpful to our confederate when they owe her a favor (simple slope of favor to repay: $b = .23, \beta = .33, t = 2.55, p = .01$, for those 1 SD above the mean on cultural rejectionism, where rejectionism is defined by low scores on the inalienable worth measure for Northern Anglos and by high scores on the inalienable worth measure for participants from the face and honor groups).

How regularly such rejectionism effects occur outside the lab is an open question. Ultimately, this question will not be fully answered until culture researchers take into account individual differences, personality researchers take into account culture, and both take into account situational press. Issues of frequency aside, however, rejectionism effects such as those in the experiments that might seem weird or anomalous from other perspectives are not at all strange from a CuPS perspective (for other examples of cultural rejectionism, see Cheng et al., 2006; Zou et al., 2008).

A Contrast and a Clarification

Contrast. The CuPS approach considers culture, person, and situation together to try to develop an integrated approach to studying between- and within-culture variation. It contrasts with the standard cultural approach that attends less to individual differences and concentrates on the cultural prototype. It contrasts with the standard individual difference approach that attends less to the way an individual difference variable means different things in different cultures. Further, it contrasts with any approach that tries to reduce culture to individual differences while ignoring the logics of the cultural syndromes under study (see Cohen & Leung, 2010; Leung & Cohen, 2007; Leung, Kim, Zhang, Tam, & Chiu, 2010, for other empirical work illustrating the usefulness of the CuPS approach). A lack of consideration of individual differences ultimately helped lead to the demise of one wing of the old culture-and-personality movement and studies of “national character” (LeVine, 2001). By treating the individual as an active agent within a cultural system, the CuPS approach tries to avoid this pitfall while also understanding the massive effect of culture on human behavior. The effect of culture is huge; it is just that people are not passive recipients of their culture, and so the effects are not uniform.

Clarification. We do believe that main effects of culture, individual differences, and situations are important and should be studied. We do not believe every phenomenon needs to be analyzed in terms of higher order interactions. As a practical matter, this would pose some difficulties. More important, we reject this idea theoretically. There are commonalities across all cultures that derive from human sociality. And it would be a
very strange world indeed if every culture had a cultural logic that was dramatically different from that of every other culture, and if every individual difference variable or every situation meant something quite different in every culture that was studied (see, e.g., Gilmore, 1990, but cf. chapters 9 and 10; Vandellos, Bosson, Cohen, Burnaford, & Weaver, 2008)."7

However, as with the experiments above, the CuPS approach illustrates the importance of culture, person, and situation variables considered together and the hazards of leaving any of these variables out. With respect to the hazards, for example, if one took the standard individual difference perspective and collapsed across cultures in Experiments 1 and 2, one would have found little in the way of effects and would have concluded that the individual difference variables were not that important. Or if one took the standard culture perspective and collapsed across individual differences, one would have found little in the way of effects and would have underappreciated the importance of culture. Thus, individual difference researchers who collapse across cultures and culture researchers who collapse across individual differences may miss not only the significance of the collapsed-across variables but the significance of their own variable of interest as well. (For another example of this point, see the CuPS interactions that emerge in the more specific case of Culture \times Gene \times Environment interactions; Chiao & Blizinsky, 2010; H. S. Kim et al., 2009.)

Finally, one issue we have not addressed is why individuals might endorse or reject the ideals of their culture in the first place. Perhaps some of this is due to matters of individual temperament that are either congruent or incongruent with cultural norms (Rozin, 2003). Perhaps some of this is due to socialization into various microcultures (of, e.g., neighborhoods, peers, or families) that align with or oppose norms of the wider society (Anderson, 1994). Perhaps some of this is due to the particular roles people inhabit within those microcultures (Merton, 1938; Plomin & Daniels, 1987; Sulloway, 1997). Related to this latter point, we believe that understanding the niches people occupy within a culture or subculture is a particularly promising area for future research. Moreover, we think that it will be useful to understand from an individual’s perspective what are the benefits and costs—material, psychological, and social—that he or she accrues by aligning him- or herself with or against a given set of norms (Bond et al., 2009; Dach-Gruschow, Hernandez, & Cohen, 2010; Konner, 2007; Schachter, 1951; Vaillant, 1993).

Conclusion

As seen above, the CuPS approach is only a rudimentary start on an approach to understanding people as individuals who necessarily operate in a cultural context. It is simplistic, but it tries to reconcile the study of individual differences and the study of culture, such that neither is viewed as error and neither is substitutable for the other (such as when culture is treated as simply an aggregation of individual differences). The CuPS approach to reconciliation requires understanding the particular cultural logics that provide meaning and frame people’s choices. The promise of such an approach that jointly considers both culture and individual differences is an integrated account that can capture more of the within- and between-culture variation in human behavior.

7 In the present article, with respect to the issue of “universal” individual difference effects, one might ask if the results of these studies are just a demonstration of the Folk Theorem that “all good things are correlated 1.” The answer to that appears to be no and is supported by two points. First, as seen in Experiment 2, for our bicultural Southerners and Latinos, what is a “good thing” depends in part on the salient cultural norm they are reacting to. Thus, the correlations between any two behaviors (in this case, honesty and the endorsement of retributive violence) can flip depending on the cultural norm that a person finds him- or herself reacting toward or against. Second, in a short background questionnaire at the end of the two experiments, we asked participants about two conventionally virtuous behaviors: how often they (a) attended church or their place of worship and (b) visited or talked with their families. If all good things are positively correlated, we would expect to see that the two virtuous measures can (a) be differentially predicted by our honor and inalienable versus social worth variables in the three cultural groups, (b) predict helping and resistance to cheating in our experiments, and (c) substitute for our honor and inalienable versus social worth measures to produce the three-way CuPS interactions of interest. However, the family visit and church attendance variables basically failed all three tests. The general conclusion from this second set of findings also suggests that one can understand the experimental results only by understanding what honor, face, and dignity are; one cannot just treat endorsement of honor, face, and dignity individual difference variables as simple generic markers for “goodness”—either within or across cultural contexts.

References


